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We provide a microfounded account of imperfect information in the
stochastic growth model which dramatically changes the properties of the
model. We describe heterogenous households that acquire information
about aggregates through their participation in markets. If markets are
incomplete, household information will be imperfect. We solve the model
taking account of the infinite regress of expectations that this lack of
information implies. We derive analytical and numerical results to show
that imperfect information can significantly change the properties of the
model: under virtually all calibrations the impact response of
consumption to a positive aggregate technology shock is negative.
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Underlying most dynamic general equilibrium modelling is the assumption
that households can perfectly observe the state variables. Complete markets
rationalize this assumption: in a decentralized equilibrium households learn
about aggregates through participating in markets, so if markets are com-
plete so too will be information. However if markets are incomplete, house-
holds will in general be imperfectly informed about the aggregate economy,
and hence about other agents. This means that rational households have to
form expectations of aggregate states, and of other households￿behaviour,
leading to an in￿nite regress of expectations (Townsend, 1983, Woodford,
2002, Nimark 2007a,b).
We describe a version of the stochastic growth model in which households
are heterogenous because they face an idiosyncratic productivity shock in
addition to the standard aggregate productivity shock. If capital is the only
tradeable asset, households￿information is limited to a knowledge of their
own capital holdings, along with the returns they observe from participating
in labour and capital markets. We describe such households solving a sig-
nal extraction problem using a version of the Kalman ￿lter that allows for
endogeneity of the states (Baxter, Graham and Wright, 2007) and explic-
itly model higher-order expectations using techniques developed by Nimark
(2007a).
A key feature of this paper is that the informational problem arises en-
dogenously. There is no "noise" in our model, and the only assumption we
make about the observability of aggregates is that households gain informa-
tion about them through their participation in markets.
We derive analytical results which show that the economy with incom-
plete markets must di⁄er from the full information economy, and show that
the di⁄erence arises from a di⁄erent response to aggregate productivity
shocks. We further show that consumption in our economy is in general
not certainty-equivalent (in the sense of Pearlman et al, 1986 or Svensson
and Woodford, 2002, 2004). We then study the model numerically and ￿nd
it di⁄ers dramatically from the complete markets economy.
In the standard stochastic growth model (which is a complete-markets
version of our economy), the impact e⁄ect of a positive aggregate productiv-
1ity shock on consumption is positive1. However, with incomplete markets
and a consistent treatment of information we ￿nd:
1. Under a wide range of calibrations the impact of a positive aggregate
productivity shock on aggregate consumption is negative.
2. The subsequent path of aggregate consumption is radically di⁄erent
from the full information case.
3. We show that certainty equivalence is a very good approximation over
a wide range of calibrations.
4. This does not mean higher-order expectations are redundant since they
improves the state forecasts which determine certainty-equivalent con-
sumption.
The intuition for why our model behaves so di⁄erently under incom-
plete markets is as follows. Households only gain information about aggre-
gates through the capital and labour markets in which they participate, so a
household observes a positive innovation to aggregate productivity as posi-
tive innovations in its wage and the return to capital. The strong empirical
evidence (for example Guvenen, 2005, 2007) that the variance of idiosyn-
cratic productivity shocks is much higher than that of aggregate shocks
means that the wage contains little useful information about aggregates, so
the main signal the household receives is a positive innovation to the return
to capital.
With imperfect information, households know that such a positive inno-
vation to returns could be caused either by a positive innovation to aggregate
productivity or by aggregate capital being lower than the household had pre-
viously estimated. The certainty equivalent response to the ￿rst would be
to increase consumption, to the second to decrease consumption.
The relative weight of these two e⁄ects depends on the structure of the
economy and the properties of the exogenous processes. But we show ana-
lytically that the second e⁄ect will, under reasonable parameter restrictions,
always cause the consumption response to be less than under full informa-
1Campbell (1994) gives precise conditions under which the impact response of con-
sumption is positive. A su¢ cient condition is that the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
is greater than unity.
2tion; and we show numerically that under a wide range of calibrations the
impact response of consumption to the shock is negative.
The study of imperfect information has a long history in macroeco-
nomics. Here we pick out two strands of the recent literature which are
particularly relevant to our work; a more complete review can be found in
Hellwig (2006). The ￿rst strand looks at the problem of setting mone-
tary policy under imperfect information. Most such models (Pearlman et
al, 1986, Svensson and Woodford, 2002, 2004, Aoki, 2003, 2006) look at the
problem of asymmetric information when the monetary policymaker has im-
perfect information but the private sector is perfectly informed. Pearlman
(1992) and Svensson and Woodford (2003) look at the case where the private
sector and the policymaker share the same imperfect information set.
A second strand, closer to the present paper, investigates the implications
of the private sector having imperfect information. Keen (2004) investigates
a model in which the private sector is poorly informed about the behaviour
of the monetary policymaker and concludes that it can account for several
business cycle features better than the standard model. In Collard and
Dellas (2006), the introduction of imperfect information in an otherwise
standard dynamic new Keynesian model can generate in￿ ation persistence,
hump-shaped dynamics of in￿ ation and output and a liquidity e⁄ect. The
e⁄ect of noise in productivity is investigated by Bom￿m (2001) who shows
that permanent / transitory confusion can lead to interesting business cy-
cle dynamics and Lorenzoni (2006) who shows that measurement error in
aggregate productivity can explain the presence of demand shocks.
In neither of these strands of the literature is an account given of the
source of the informational restrictions: either measurement error is intro-
duced ad hoc, or some variables are simply assumed not to be observed.
In contrast, in our model the informational problem on the part of agents
arises from the presence of an idiosyncratic productivity shock2, and model
information in a market-consistent matter, so information is only available
to households through the markets in which they trade. We show that
"noise" is not necessary to motivate informational problems.
Our households know that all other household in the economy face a
2Lorenzoni (2006) presents a model very close to ours in that households face both an
aggregate and an idiosyncratic productivty shock. The focus of his paper is on showing
that a noise component in aggregate productivity can produce aggregate e⁄ects which
resemble demand shocks.
3similar inference problem, but with a di⁄erent information set. To forecast
aggregates, a household must forecast the behaviour of all other households,
which requires us to model higher-order expectations. Townsend (1983)
￿rst analysed the problem of "forecasting the forecasts of others" and the
in￿nite regress of expectations that results. Woodford (2002) shows that
the dynamics of such higher-order expectations can lead to shocks having
more persistent e⁄ects. Here we draw on recent work by Nimark (2007a)
who derives new techniques for modelling the resulting in￿nite-dimensional
state vector when agents make dynamic choices.3
The literature on the relation between informational imperfections and
incomplete markets is vast, but has mainly focussed on the implications for
￿nancial markets (Marin and Rahi, 2000, review some of this literature).
In terms of the macroeconomy, Levine and Zame (2002) ask "Does market
incompleteness matter?" and answer that it does not. Our paper shows
that, while incomplete markets alone do not change aggregate properties,
once we take account of the informational implications of incomplete markets
the answer can change radically.
Section 2 describes the model and section 3 considers two benchmark
cases. In section 4, we formalize the information set of agents, show how the
in￿nite hierarchy of expectations arises and de￿ne the equilibrium. Section
5 presents our analytical results, and section 6 gives numerical results. We
draw out some implications of our model in section 7 and conclude in section
8.
2 The stochastic growth model with incomplete
markets and idiosyncratic productivity shocks
The economy consists of a large number of households and a large number
of ￿rms. We divide our economy into S islands, on each of which there are
many ￿rms and households. Households consume, rent capital and labour
to ￿rms and are subject to an island-speci￿c shock to labour productivity.
Firms use capital and labour to produce a single consumption good with
a technology that is subject to an aggregate productivity shock. Markets
3Nimark￿ s (2007b) analysis of the inference problem with higher expectations in a
model of sticky prices is also a rare example of a paper in which, as in ours, imperfect
information is due to heterogeneity rather than arbitrary noise.
4are incomplete in that the only asset available is capital, and while labour
is heterogenous across islands, we assume that capital is homogenous and
can freely ￿ ow between islands. Our model is similar to versions of the
stochastic growth model with heterogeneity by Maliar and Maliar (2003)
and Nakajima (2005). We focus here on the key structural relationships;
the full log-linearised model is provided in Appendix A
We use upper case letters for levels, lower case letters for log deviations.
Letters without a time subscript indicate steady states. A superscript s
indicates a variable relating to a household or ￿rm on island s. Without
the superscript the variable is an aggregate.
2.1 Households
A typical household on island s consumes (Cs
t) and rents capital (Ks
t) and
labour (Hs
t ) to ￿rms. Household labour on each island has idiosyncratic
productivity (Zs) whereas capital is homogenous, so households earn the
aggregate return (Rt) on capital but an idiosyncratic wage (V s
t ) on their
labour. In our central case we assume that markets are incomplete and the
only asset available to households is capital.
The problem of a household of type s is to choose paths for consumption,


















￿ is the intertemporal elasticity of labour supply, and ￿ the subjective
discount rate, subject to a resource constraint
RtKs





and the evolution of the household￿ s holdings of capital
Ks
t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Ks
t + Is
t (3)
The expectations operator for an individual household is de￿ned as the
expectation given the household￿ s information set ￿s





5We assume that, apart from the idiosyncratic shock, households are iden-
tical across types and hence are unconditionally identical, and on any given
island all households behave identically.




























t is the labour of households on island s that the ￿rm hires, Js
t is
capital and At is an aggregate productivity shock.















t is the wage paid to the labour that the ￿rm hires.
2.3 Aggregates
Aggregate quantities are sums over household or ￿rm quantities, and for con-
venience we calculate them as quantities per household type. For example








The economy￿ s aggregate resource constraint is then
Yt = Ct + It (10)














but in general Js
t 6= Ks
t; given free ￿ ow of capital between islands.
2.4 Markets
For simplicity, we assume that labour markets are completely segmented
between islands, so ￿rms on island s only rent labour from households on
island s, and the wage on island s, V s
t , adjusts to set labour supply (5) equal
to labour demand (8).
In contrast, capital is assumed to be homogenous and tradeable between
islands, so ￿ ows to islands with more productive labour. The aggregate
return to capital, Rt, adjusts to clear the capital market, making the demand
for capital for each ￿rm (7) consistent with each household￿ s Euler equation
(4) and the aggregate resource constraint (10).
2.5 Shocks
For both the aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity shocks we assume
autoregressive processes in deviations





where $t and $s






z. Following Campbell (1994), we assume that aggregate technology has
a steady state growth rate of g.
We further assume that the innovation to the idiosyncratic process sat-








t = 0: (14)
72.6 The system
While our underlying model is non-linear, we work with the log-linear ap-
proximation to the model which will allow us to use a linear ￿lter to model
the household￿ s signal extraction problem4.
We show in Appendix A.4 that the features of the economy relevant to



















is a vector of underlying states relevant to a house-













t ￿kt.The coe¢ cient
matrices FW;Fc and Fs are de￿ned in Appendix A.4.
The linearisation is very close to that Campbell (1994): indeed the co-
e¢ cients for the aggregate part of our economy are identical to his.
De￿nition 1 (Equilibrium) A competitive equilibrium for the above econ-
omy is a sequence of plans for












￿ aggregate factor inputs fkt;htgt=1:1
such that
1. Given prices and informational restrictions, the allocations solve the




t=1:1 are the marginal products of aggregate capital and labour
of di⁄erent types
3. All markets clear
4Log linearisation is common to all the literature on imperfect information cited in the
introduction.
83 Benchmark cases
The main focus of this paper is an economy in which the only tradeable
asset is capital, and, consistent with a decentralized equilibrium, agents are
not directly provided with information on the aggregate states. However,
as benchmark cases we ￿rst investigate the case of complete markets, which
we show reveal full information, and that of incomplete markets with full
information simply assumed.
De￿nition 2 (Full information) Full information, which we denote by
an information set ￿￿
t, is knowledge of the aggregate states in the economy
￿t, the idiosyncratic states ￿s
t of all household types and the time-invariant











Complete markets imply the existence of a set of securities that span the dis-
tribution of idiosyncratic shocks, and that are freely available for all agents
to trade. Thus complete risk-sharing is possible5 and in the process the
household productivity shocks zs are revealed to all households, so each
household knows both the aggregate wage and the full set of disaggregate
wages. Risk-sharing implies that household paths of consumption are per-
fectly correlated so each household also knows aggregate consumption. Since
households observe both the return to capital and the aggregate wage, it is
straightforward to show that they can recover the aggregate state variables
￿t.
Thus complete markets reveal complete information, and there is a repre-
sentative household whose consumption is equal to aggregate consumption,





￿ is a vector of time-invariant coe¢ cients, see (C.13), that can be
found by standard solution techniques for rational expectations models.6
5The net e⁄ect of the payo⁄s on these securities for each individual will be to replace
the left-hand side of (2) with a constant share of aggregate income.
6Maliar and Maliar (2005) show that a complete markets economy with a closely related
9Given perfect risk-sharing and symmetry all households have consumption
equal to aggregate consumption.
3.2 Full information and incomplete markets
In this second special case we revert to our central assumption that the
only asset available to agents is capital, so agents will be unable to trade
away idiosyncratic risk. However we assume that despite the absence of
markets that reveal the idiosyncratic states, agents nonetheless have full
information, provided as an endowment. We show later (Proposition 3)
that this assumption of incomplete markets and complete information is
fundamentally inconsistent, but it nonetheless provides a useful analytical
building block.
The properties of this economy are summarised in the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 1 (Full information and incomplete markets)In the het-
erogeneous economy with incomplete markets each household￿ s optimal con-
















1. The coe¢ cients in ￿￿
￿ are identical to those under complete markets in
equation (18).
2. The coe¢ cients in ￿￿
￿ solve the undetermined coe¢ cients problem for
￿￿
￿ in a parallel complete markets economy in which the persistence of
aggregate productivity is the same as that of idiosyncratic productivity
(￿a = ￿z) and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is zero.
3. Aggregate consumption in this economy is identical to the complete







t = ￿￿0￿t = c￿
t (20)
form of heterogeneity leads to a representative consumer with a utility function with
"preference shocks". This does not arise in our economy due to the adding up constraint
across idiosyncratic shocks (14), and the multiplicative nature of the shocks (a case noted
by Maliar and Maliar (2005) in their footnote 2).
10Proof. See Appendix C
Corollary 1 Under full information, the idiosyncratic element in consump-
tion is a random walk, and the idiosyncratic element in capital is a unit root
process
The combination of incomplete markets and complete information (pro-
vided as an endowment) results in an economy which is identical at an ag-
gregate level to the complete markets economy, but which di⁄ers markedly
at a household level.
A household￿ s response to an idiosyncratic productivity shock is very
di⁄erent from its response to an aggregate productivity shock because idio-
syncratic productivity shocks do not a⁄ect expectations of future returns,
so are, from the household￿ s point of view, simply a change in permanent in-
come. Proposition 1 states that these optimising responses to idiosyncratic
shocks will be identical to what the responses of aggregate consumption
to aggregate shocks would be in a complete markets economy with no in-
tertemporal substitution. The permanent income response to idiosyncratic
shocks in turn implies that the idiosyncratic component of consumption is
a random walk as in Hall (1978).7 However, the adding-constraint across
idiosyncratic shocks means that such permanent shifts in idiosyncratic con-
sumption cancel out in the aggregate.
4 Incomplete markets and imperfect information
Our basic assumption is that markets are incomplete in the sense that capital
is the only tradeable asset. Our key assumption in all that follows that
households only obtain information from the markets they participate in so,
consistent with our assumption on markets, we can write the information















7Recall Campbell￿ s (1994) result that such an economy will generate consumption
responses in line with the permanent income hypothesis.
11where ￿ contains the parameters and structure of the underlying model and
is therefore time-invariant8.













and we can write the measurement vector as
is
t = HwWs
t + Hcct (24)
where the matrices Hw and Hc are de￿ned in Appendix A.5.
We show in the Appendix A.5 that the three observables are given by
rt = ￿3 (at + ht ￿ kt) (25)
ks
t = ￿s
t + kt (26)
ws
t = wt + zs
t (27)
so this information set does not, in general, allow households to recover
either aggregate or idiosyncratic states.
The informational problem in our model arises because, since aggregates
are not directly observable, households are unable to distinguish between
aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Thus innovations in the
observable variables could be caused either by true innovations to the ex-
ogenous processes, or by households￿estimates of the aggregate states being
incorrect.
4.1 The hierarchy of expectations
In this section we de￿ne the state vector relevant to household s; consisting
of the underlying states Ws
t (de￿ned after (16)) and an in￿nite hierarchy of
average expectations (Townsend, 1983, Woodford, 2002, Nimark, 2007a) of













however, since each of these histories embodies the household￿ s own responses to the
evolution of ￿
s
t; it contains no information not already in ￿
s
t.



















The ￿rst-order average expectation W
(1)
t is an average over all households￿






















t ;k > 1 (31)
Given the household consumption function (28), the de￿nition of aggre-


















In the case of full information, described in Section 3, the hierarchy
becomes redundant, since higher-order elements in the hierarchy are simply










: k ￿ 1 (34)
where the lower block of zeros exploits the adding up constraint in (14).
4.1.1 A heuristic argument
To see why Xs
t is the relevant state vector, consider the following heuris-
tic argument. First assume that households think that only the non-
13expectational states Ws






Assuming the household knows that all other households will behave in the












But then the original consumption function is mis-speci￿ed since to cor-
rectly forecast the aggregate economy using (16) household s must forecast
aggregate consumption, which depends on W
(1)
























hence the household state vector should again be augmented to include
W
(2)
t ; and so forth. This leads to an "in￿nite regress" (Townsend, 1983 )
of expectations, so the state vector of individual s must contain an in￿nite
hierarchy of expectations.
4.2 The household￿ s signal extraction problem
To implement optimal consumption (28), a household of type s must form
estimates of the in￿nite-dimension state vector Xs
t by using the information
￿s
t available to it. The optimal linear ￿lter is the Kalman ￿lter, however
this problem di⁄ers signi￿cantly from the standard Kalman ￿lter in two
ways. The ￿rst di⁄erence is that the states depend on the household￿ s choice
variable cs
t. Baxter, Graham and Wright (2007) describe this "endogenous"
Kalman ￿lter in detail, and gives conditions for its stability and convergence
which are satis￿ed here. Secondly, since the aggregate states depend on












nor in general can W
(1)
t be expressed as a simple linear combination of non-expectational
states, hence it is indeed required as an additional state vector
14aggregate consumption, and hence the behaviour of all other households,
we need to make an assumption about what household s knows about the
behaviour of all other households. We follow Nimark (2007) in assuming
that each household applies the Kalman Filter to the entire model on the
assumption that each other household is behaving in the same way.
Assumption 1: It is common knowledge that all households￿expecta-
tions are rational (model consistent).
Nimark (2007) discusses this assumption in more detail, but it is essen-
tially a generalization of the full information rational expectations assump-
tion.
Given Assumption 1, we show in Appendix D that each household faces









where L; M; N and H are matrices yet to be determined and is
t is the
measurement vector of household s; de￿ned before equation (23).
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium with market-consistent imperfect in-
formation) In an economy in which each household
a. Has an information set of the form (21)
b. Forms optimal forecasts of the states Xs
t by solving the household-
speci￿c ￿ltering problem given by (35) and (36)
c. Chooses consumption to satisfy its Euler equation (15)
An equilibrium which satis￿es Assumption 1 and De￿nition 1 is a ￿xed























15where ￿, the gain matrix of the endogenous Kalman ￿lter, is de￿ned










and L;H and R are de￿ned in Appendix D.
Proof. See Appendix D
4.3 Solution technique
We solve the iterative system of equations given by (37) to (39) for a typical
household. The solution to this problem implies a law of motion both for
any individual household￿ s state estimates, which evolve by (40), but also,
when we average across such updating rules, for the hierarchy of average
expectations. This in turn, via (32), determines the solution for aggregate
consumption, consistent with each household solving a symmetric ￿ltering
and optimal consumption problem. While we model the behaviour of a typ-
ical household, there is no representative household in this economy.
5 Properties of the economy with incomplete mar-
kets and imperfect information
In this section we derive analytical results which show that imperfect in-
formation changes the nature of the economy, and explain the mechanism
behind this. We further show that consumption in our model is in general
not certainty equivalent, but that we can decompose household consump-
tion into a certainty-equivalent response and a component arising from the
hierarchy of expectations. To simplify the analysis, the propositions in this
section consider only the case of ￿xed labour supply (￿ = 1).10
Proposition 3 (Non-Replication of Full Information) If the vari-
ance of the idiosyncratic shocks is non-zero (￿z > 0), the economy
described in Proposition 2 can never replicate the full information
10We conjecture that all remain valid under variable labour supply. This can be veri￿ed
numerically, but the analytical proofs become much more convoluted. In the proofs we
note the implications of relaxing the assumption.
16economy. However deviations from full information are transi-
tory even when there are permanent shocks to underlying states,
and the informational problem does not change the steady state.
Proof. See Appendix E
In the economy we describe, households have a restricted information set,
given by (21), which arises from the factor markets they trade in. Proposi-
tion 3 shows that this informational problem always matters for the equilib-
rium of the economy. The proof makes clear that this result is non-trivial,
and that the idiosyncratic productivity shocks cause the informational prob-
lem. We show in our numerical results, Section 6, that the di⁄erences from
the full information equilibrium are quantitatively signi￿cant, but Proposi-
tion 3 states that such di⁄erences must be transitory. Imperfect information
can only have implication for business cycle dynamics, and not for the long-
run growth properties of the model.
Corollary 2 As the economy approaches the limiting homogeneous
case (as ￿z ! 0) it approaches the complete markets economy.
Furthermore, in this limiting case, as t ! 1 the entire history of
returns frsg
t
s=1 becomes informationally redundant.
Proposition 3 draws out the crucial link between household heterogene-
ity, incomplete markets and information. In the limit, with no idiosyncratic
shocks, all households are, and know themselves to be, identical. Even
though markets are incomplete, this only matters to the extent that house-
holds di⁄er from each other. Since risk-sharing markets can only smooth
out the impact of idiosyncratic shocks, their absence becomes unimportant
as these idiosyncratic shocks disappear, as do the informational problems
associated with incomplete markets. In the limit each household can per-
fectly observe both the aggregate wage and the return, and thereby trivially
infer the values of the aggregate states. But the corollary goes further than
this: given a su¢ ciently large number of observations, households do not
even need the history of returns: an information set consisting only of the
history of aggregate wages is su¢ cient to reveal the states.
5.1 The impact of aggregate productivity shocks
We have shown that the economy with imperfect information must di⁄er
from the full information economy. Since the adding-up constraint across
17idiosyncratic shocks (14) means that the aggregate economy is only driven
by the process for aggregate productivity, the di⁄erences from full informa-
tion must arise from a di⁄erent dynamic response to aggregate productivity
shocks. The following proposition states the key features of this response.
Proposition 4 (Impact e⁄ects of aggregate productivity shocks) In
the economy characterized by Proposition 3, a positive aggregate productivity
shock has the following e⁄ects on impact:
a) Household estimates of aggregate capital unambiguously fall;
b) If the persistence of idiosyncratic productivity is less than some value
strictly greater than the persistence of aggregate productivity (i.e. ￿z < ￿ ￿z >
￿a) household (and hence aggregate) consumption is unambiguously lower
than under full information.
Proof. See Appendix F.
In our economy households must base their estimates of underlying states
on the signals they observe from markets. When a positive aggregate pro-
ductivity shock hits, each household will observe this as a simultaneous rise
in the aggregate return on capital and their own wage. While the former is
a "pure" signal of aggregates, the latter also contains information on idio-
syncratic states. As such it can be interpreted as a ￿noisy￿signal of the
aggregate economy, although it di⁄ers from standard signal-noise problems
in that here what is noise with respect to the aggregate economy conveys
information about idiosyncratic states that is also important to the house-
hold.
The ￿rst part of this proposition states that the signal extraction problem
means that a positive aggregate productivity shock always causes house-
holds to revise downwards their estimate of aggregate capital. So what
is unambiguously good news under full information becomes, under incom-
plete markets, a mixture of good and bad news, causing the consumption
response to be smaller on impact.
To see why the estimate of capital falls, note that a general property of
optimal ￿ltering is that forecasts of states must always have lower variance
than the actual states11. With respect to aggregate productivity this implies
that the household￿ s estimate must respond less to shocks than does actual
11For some variable qt and household s￿ s estimate thereof, E
s






18productivity. For a productivity shock in period 1, and assuming we start
from the steady state, this means Es
1a1 < a1. Estimates must be consistent
with observations, i.e. Es
1r1 = r1. The return to capital is given from (25)
by rt = ￿3 (at ￿ kt) so
a1 ￿ k1 = Es
1 (a1 ￿ k1) (41)
Since capital is predetermined, k1 = 0 so
Es
1k1 = Es
1a1 ￿ a1 < 0 (42)
Thus the estimate of capital must fall on the impact of a positive innovation
to aggregate productivity.
The nature of the consumption response is also driven by the require-
ment that state estimates are consistent with observations. Households
know their own capital, which is predetermined. This implies that if a house-
hold revises its estimate of aggregate capital downwards, it must revise its
estimate of the idiosyncratic component of its own capital ( ￿s
t = ks
t ￿ kt)
upwards by exactly the same amount. It is also quite easy to show (see
Appendix G) that the same must apply for the estimate of idiosyncratic
productivity. Thus bad news on capital in the aggregate economy is always
o⁄set by good news on the idiosyncratic economy.
As idiosyncratic productivity becomes more persistent, an estimated pos-
itive innovation to idiosyncratic productivity becomes better news. But
the parameter restriction in part b) of Proposition 4 states that, unless the
persistence of idiosyncratic productivity becomes very high, the bad news
about aggregate capital will always outweigh the good news on the idiosyn-
cratic economy. Since aggregate shocks a⁄ect all households symmetrically
(though not observably so), this implies that the response of aggregate con-
sumption must also be strictly less than under full information.
We show numerically in Section 6.6 below that ￿ ￿z; the upper bound
for ￿z; the persistence of idiosyncratic productivity, is always very close to
unity, so this is very close to being a general result.
where f
s
t is a ￿ltering error. E¢ ciency of the ￿lter implies cov (qt;f
s




195.2 A reduced state vector and implications for consump-
tion.
The equilibrium described by Proposition 3 requires each household to form
an optimal forecast of all elements of the hierarchy of average expectations.
However, the following proposition states that the dimension of this problem
can be signi￿cantly reduced:










Proof. See Appendix G
This result arises because, for each household, estimates of the non-
expectational states, Es
tWs
t must, to be consistent with the information set,





t ] = 0 (43)
which arises directly from the measurement equation (24). We show in
Appendix G that this implies restrictions across the full hierarchy of average
expectations and leads to the reduced state vector. This in turn implies an
alternative speci￿cation of the consumption function in (28) which will prove
useful in subsequent analysis
Corollary 3 (Decomposition of consumption function) The consump-

















It is a standard result12 in the existing literature on optimising behaviour
under symmetric imperfect information that the property of certainty equiv-
alence holds: optimal choices are the same linear function of estimated state
variables as of actual state variables under full information. In the context
of our model this implies the following de￿nition:
12See, for example, Pearlman et al (1986), Svensson and Woodford (2002, 2004); Baxter
Graham and Wright (2007)
20De￿nition 3 (Certainty Equivalence): Each household￿ s consumption







W is the vector of coe¢ cients in the consumption function under full
information in Proposition 1.
We showed in Section 4.1 that this property will not hold in our model,
and optimal consumption will instead depend on the full hierarchy of ex-
pectations. But by inspection of (44), this dependence can be broken down
into a certainty-equivalent response, and a response which is driven by the
extent to which the household believes that the hierarchy of expectations of
aggregate technology di⁄ers from the household￿ s own estimate. Using this
decomposition we can show that the concept of certainty equivalence still
plays an important role in our model.
Proposition 6 (Deviations from Certainty Equivalence)
1. The two limiting cases of the economy, as ￿s tends to zero (the ho-
mogeneous case), and as ￿s ! 1 (extreme heterogeneity), are both
certainty equivalent.
2. For intermediate cases certainty equivalence does not hold.
Proof. See Appendix H
Corollary 2 means that the limiting homogeneous case is trivially cer-
tainty equivalent. To see why the limiting case of extreme heterogeneity
is also certainty equivalent, we need to consider the link between market
incompleteness and informational problems.
While returns provide a signal exclusively about the aggregate block of
the economy, for the general case the household￿ s wage ws
t provides a signal
about both aggregate and idiosyncratic blocks. However, as agents become
more heterogeneous the signal from the wage is increasingly dominated by
the impact of the idiosyncratic economy. As ￿s tends to in￿nity, the economy
is e⁄ectively segmented into two distinct blocks, with returns providing the
only information about the aggregate block, and the wage providing informa-
tion only about the idiosyncratic block. Each household updates estimates
21of aggregate states using only information on returns, which is common
knowledge, so from Assumption 1 each household knows that every other
household will update their estimates in the same way. Hence all households
have identical estimates of aggregate states, which straightforwardly implies
that the entire hierarchy of expectations of aggregate states is known, and
equal to each household￿ s estimates. Hence, by inspection of (44), certainty
equivalence must hold in this limiting case.
6 Numerical results
6.1 Calibration
Given the degree of uncertainty over some of the key parameters, the values
we choose in this section should be seen as giving a baseline case which we use
to generate impulse response functions and give intuition for our results. We
carry out sensitivity analysis to all of the important parameters in Section
6.6 below.
The key parameters are the persistence and innovation variance of the
aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity processes. We calibrate the ag-
gregate productivity shock with the benchmark RBC values for persistence
of ￿a = 0:9 and an innovation standard deviation ￿a = 0:7% per quarter
(Prescott, 1986). In Appendix B we discuss the details of our calibration
of the idiosyncratic technology process, drawing on the empirical literature
on labour income processes. It turns out that a calibration which sets idio-
syncratic persistence equal to aggregate persistence (i.e. ￿z = ￿a = 0:9)
is consistent with Guvenen￿ s (2005, 2007) recent estimates using US panel
data. There is however strong evidence that idiosyncratic technology has a
much higher innovation standard deviation. In Appendix B we show that a
￿gure of 4:9% per quarter is consistent with Guvenen￿ s results.
Card (1994) estimates the intertemporal elasticity of labour supply, 1
￿
to be between 0.05 and 0.5. For our baseline calibration, we choose ￿ = 5,
in the middle of this range. For the other parameters we follow Campbell
(1994)13.
13￿ = 0:025;￿ = 0:667;￿ = 0:99;H = 0:33;g = 0:005
226.2 Numerical solution method
All of our theoretical results relate to a representation with an in￿nite di-
mension state vector. Nimark (2007a) shows that the in￿nite hierarchy can
be approximated to an arbitrary accuracy by a ￿nite order representation.
We adapt his approach by truncating the hierarchy and writing a state vec-












where h is the order of the truncation. For our baseline calibration, we use
h = 5. Adding an extra order to the hierarchy would change the impact
e⁄ect of consumption reported below by 10￿7.
6.3 The nature of impulse response functions
Before discussing impulse responses in our calibration, we should note an
important caveat. The response pro￿les discussed in the next three sec-
tions di⁄er from standard impulse response functions under full information,
in that we examine the impact of shocks to the two underlying stochastic
processes, at and zs
t that are unobservable to any agents in the economy.
The impulse response functions we obtain could not therefore be observed
contemporaneously.
As a result of this informational asymmetry between agents and the ob-
server, the stochastic properties of the model are crucial in determining the
nature of impulse response functions, in a way that they are not under full
information. Under full information, after the initial shock has taken place,
the remainder of the impulse response is equivalent to a perfect foresight
path, and is thus known in advance to both observer and agents in the
model. In contrast, under incomplete information, the agents in the model
are continuously making inferences from new information as it emerges, and
thus can only imperfectly predict their future behaviour. In making these
inferences the underlying stochastic properties of the model are crucial, in
a way that they are not under full information.14
14To be precise, impulse responses under incomplete information depend on the parame-
ters in the true covariance matrix of structural shocks Q; whereas under full information
they do not.
236.4 Response to an aggregate productivity shock
Figure 1 shows the response of consumption in our baseline model to a
1% positive innovation in the process for aggregate productivity. This
clearly demonstrates our key result: the response of aggregate consumption
is signi￿cantly negative on impact of a positive productivity shock.

















For comparison, Figure 1 also shows the response of consumption un-
der full information which mimics the standard RBC result. Under full
information consumption increases on impact by 0:18%, under imperfect in-
formation it falls by 0:41%. In Section 6.6 below we show that this negative
response is robust to a very wide range of variation in structural parameter
values. Here we give an intuitive explanation of this feature.
On impact, a household does not observe the aggregate productivity
shock directly, but only the associated positive innovations to the market
return and the idiosyncratic wage. The household knows that these inno-
vations could have arisen either because there were structural shocks this
period, or because the state estimates on which its previous forecasts were
based were incorrect. In response to the innovations, the household up-
dates its state estimates using (40) and it is the revised state estimates that
determine the response of consumption response via (28).
15x-axis shows periods; y-axis shows percentage deviations from steady state
24Corollary 3 shows that the response of the economy can be decomposed
into two components: a certainty-equivalent response, and a response de-
pendent on the hierarchy of expectations. Idiosyncratic productivity in our
baseline calibration is much more volatile than aggregate productivity, and
numerically we can show that the impulse responses are close to those in
the limiting case of extreme heterogeneity. So the responses are domi-
nated by the certainty-equivalent part, and the impact of the hierarchy is
quantitatively small. We discuss each of the components of the response in
turn.
6.4.1 The certainty-equivalent response
Assume for purposes of illustration that the economy is initially in steady
state in period 0; before the shock occurs, with all states equal to their
steady state values of zero. Given this initial position, under the assumption




























Since all agents are identical aggregate consumption is equal to idiosyncratic
consumption ct = cs
t 8t;(but crucially, given the caveats of Section 6.3, not
observably so).
Figure 2: Response of state estimates to a 1% positive























25Figure 2 shows how these state estimates respond to the innovations in
the return and the idiosyncratic wage caused by the aggregate productivity
shock. To understand these responses, consider the impact on each of the
state estimates in turn
1. Aggregate productivity (at). We have shown in Proposition 4 that
the estimated value must increase by strictly less than the true in-
crease. Numerically we can show that even the sign of the response
is ambiguous. A positive innovation in returns could be caused by a
positive innovation to aggregate productivity this period, but it could
also be due to capital having been previously over-estimated. Since
agents already know what the return was in previous periods, the only
way this given historic return pro￿le can be reconciled with a lower
estimate of capital both now and in the past is if they also revise down
their estimate of past levels of productivity . The more persistent is
aggregate productivity, the greater this o⁄setting e⁄ect will be. In our
baseline calibration the two e⁄ects are of similar magnitude so that,
as shown in Figure 2, the impact of the innovations on the household￿ s
estimate of aggregate productivity is very close to zero.
2. Aggregate capital (kt). Proposition 4 shows that the estimate of
aggregate capital must fall on impact. Given the observed positive
innovation to returns, the less a given increase in true aggregate tech-
nology is attributed to estimated technology, the worse the news must
be for aggregate capital: i.e. the more it is interpreted by households
as a signal that their estimates of aggregate capital were too high in
the past.
3. The Idiosyncratic component of capital (￿s
t): As we noted in our dis-
cussion of Proposition 4, since households observe their own capital
directly, any change in their estimate of aggregate capital must be
precisely o⁄set by an updated estimate of the idiosyncratic element of




4. Idiosyncratic productivity (zs
t). An increase in the wage always causes
households to increase their estimates of idiosyncratic productivity.
The more heterogeneous the economy the more a rise in the wage is
attributed to this cause.
26In the Appendix C we show ￿k > ￿￿ and for the parameter restriction
in Proposition 4 (i.e. ￿z < ￿z > ￿a) ￿a > ￿z. In our calibration, ￿k = 0:57;
￿￿ = 0:08;￿a = 0:18 and ￿z = 0:08. Since Es
tk1 < 0 and Es
ta1 ￿ 0; this
means that, given (46) and the changes in the state estimates described
above, consumption falls on impact.
In the next period the household again observes innovations to its idio-
syncratic wage and the market return and these will again di⁄er from the
forecasts since the household￿ s estimates of the states were di⁄erent from the
true states. The household repeats the process described above, of updating
its state estimates using the information contained in the innovations and
then using these new estimates to form forecasts of the observed variables.
In the next period, the realisations of these variables will again di⁄er from
the forecasts, giving the household more information about the true states.
Given the initially low level of consumption compared to full information,
the actual capital stock is higher throughout, and hence as state estimates
improve consumption ultimately overshoots the full information response
before ultimately returning to the steady state.
6.4.2 The impact of the hierarchy
The calibrated case turns out to be numerically very close to the limiting
case of extreme heterogeneity. This means that households are very close
to having common estimates of aggregate states, and hence, via (44) the
consumption function is very close to being certainty-equivalent. Table 1
shows the impact e⁄ects on the di⁄erent orders of the hierarchy.
Table 1: Impact e⁄ect of an aggregate technology shock on the
hierarchy of expectations
i 1 2 3 4 5
a
(i)
1 0:1896 0:1737 0:1734 0:1734 0:1734
Given Proposition 6, which states that at the two limiting cases consump-
tion will be certainty equivalent, there will be some value of the variance of
the idiosyncratic shock which maximises the deviation from certainty equiv-
alence, and hence the impact of the hierarchy. Numerically we ￿nd that
this value is very small, but since this in turn implies that deviations from
full information are small the quantitative impact of the hierarchy is always
27small. For variances one tenth of the value in our baseline calibration, the
deviation from certainty equivalence remains quantitatively unimportant.
The limited nature of deviations from certainty equivalence does not
imply that the hierarchy of expectations is redundant. Even when certainty
equivalence is close to holding in terms of state estimates, these estimates
themselves are more e¢ cient due to the improved forecasts each household
can make of the economy.
6.5 Response to an idiosyncratic productivity shock
With incomplete markets, households cannot insure against idiosyncratic
shocks. Under full information, the household knows that an idiosyncratic
shock has no e⁄ect on aggregates and hence none on future returns, so the
response follows the permanent income hypothesis, as in Proposition 1.
Figure 3: Response of idiosyncratic consumption to a 1%















Figure 3 shows the response a given household to a 1% positive innova-
tion to the process for idiosyncratic productivity. With imperfect informa-
tion, consumption overshoots the full information response on impact, and
then converges only slowly back. The response is very close to that under
full information, in contrast to the case of an aggregate productivity shock
where imperfect information dramatically changes the response. This is a
consequence of the large variance of the idiosyncratic shock compared to the
28aggregate shock: the observed innovations are unconditionally much more
likely to be due to an idiosyncratic shock. 16
Although the response to idiosyncratic shocks is small (0.08% compared
to a full information impact response of 0.26% for an aggregate productivity
shock of the same magnitude), their much higher variance means that the
behaviour of each household is dominated by these shocks and the macro-
economy is in e⁄ect a sideshow.
6.6 Sensitivities
Our key result is that, under imperfect information, the response of aggre-
gate consumption to a positive aggregate productivity shock is always less
than under full information, and it is negative in our baseline calibration.
In this section we examine how robust this is to changes in the calibration.
Apart from the elasticity of labour supply, 1
￿,the standard real business
cycle parameters do not have any great e⁄ect on the result, since while
they change the structure of the economy they do not change the nature of
the informational problem that drives our result. Since the informational
problem is about identifying whether an aggregate or idiosyncratic shock
has occurred, the properties of these two processes impact our results.
Proposition 4, part b) states there is a threshold value ￿ ￿z of the persis-
tence of the idiosyncratic shock for which the impact response is less than
that under full information. Table 2 shows this threshold, both for the ￿xed
labour supply case considered in the proposition and the calibrated value
of ￿, for di⁄erent values of the persistence of aggregate technology. Clearly,
Proposition 4b is very close to being a general result: consumption under
responds when compared with the full information case.
16As the economy tends to the limiting case of extreme heterogeneity we can show
that household responses to idiosyncratic shocks will precisely match those under full
information - only the response to aggregate shocks will be distorted. Conversely, as the
economy approaches homogeneity (￿z ! 0), and thus, from Corollary 2, gets arbitrarily
close to replicating the full information response to an aggregate shock, the household￿ s
over-response to an idiosyncratic shock attains a maximum. But this is a rational response,
given the vanishingly small contribution of idiosyncratic shocks to innovations in the
household￿ s information set.
29Table 2: Critical values, ￿ ￿z (as de￿ned in Proposition 4) of
persistence of idiosyncratic shock
￿a 0:95 0:9 0:8 0:5 0:2 0
Fixed labour: ￿ = 1 0:998 0:997 0:995 0:994 0:993 0:993
Variable labour:￿ = 5 0:997 0:996 0:995 0:993 0:993 0:992
NB: base case shown in bold
Table 3 shows how the impact response of consumption to a true aggre-
gate productivity shock varies with the persistence of the aggregate shock,
￿a and that of the idiosyncratic shock, ￿z (the baseline calibration is in
bold). Unconditional variances determine the signal extraction problem, so
as the persistences fall, so too does the degree of the informational problem
and the response of consumption becomes less negative. However for the
idiosyncratic process, there is an o⁄setting e⁄ect As the idiosyncratic shock
becomes more persistent, the "good news" from an estimated innovation to
idiosyncratic productivity o⁄sets the "bad news" on aggregate capital, so
the response of consumption becomes less negative. As ￿z approaches the
critical values in table 2 the response of consumption becomes less negative.
Table 3: Impact e⁄ect of aggregate technology shock on
aggregate consumption: sensitivity to persistence parameters
￿a
￿z 0:95 0:9 0:85 0:7 0:5
0:95 ￿0:541 ￿0:338 ￿0:238 ￿0:115 ￿0:059
0:9 ￿0:614 ￿0:410 ￿0:301 ￿0:157 ￿0:087
0:85 ￿0:603 ￿0:423 ￿0:318 ￿0:172 ￿0:098
0:7 ￿0:426 ￿0:374 ￿0:305 ￿0:180 ￿0:107
0:5 ￿0:097 ￿0:245 ￿0:241 ￿0:169 ￿0:107
NB: base case shown in bold
Table 4 shows how the impact response of consumption to a true ag-
gregate productivity shock varies as the innovation standard deviation ￿z
and persistence of the idiosyncratic process (￿z) change. The second col-
umn, with an in￿nite variance of the idiosyncratic shock, corresponds to the
limiting heterogeneous case of Proposition 6, the ￿nal column, with a zero
variance, to the limiting homogenous case.
30Table 4: Impact e⁄ect of aggregate technology shock on
aggregate consumption: sensitivity to properties of idiosyncratic
shock
￿z=￿a
￿z 1 10 5 2 1 0
0:95 ￿0:352 ￿0:345 ￿0:338 ￿0:273 ￿0:113 0:183
0:9 ￿0:440 ￿0:425 ￿0:410 ￿0:276 0:022 0:183
0:85 ￿0:474 ￿0:448 ￿0:424 ￿0:211 0:058 0:183
0:7 ￿0:510 ￿0:438 ￿0:376 ￿0:009 0:126 0:183
0:5 ￿0:526 ￿0:365 ￿0:245 0:0763 0:160 0:183
NB: base case shown in bold
As the relative standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock decreases,
going from left to right in the table, the information problem becomes less
acute so the impact response of consumption becomes less negative. As
the persistence of the shock falls, the unconditional variance falls so the
informational problem becomes less acute. However this is o⁄set by the
second e⁄ect described above. Since the unconditional variance is a multiple
of the innovation variance, the relative strength of the ￿rst e⁄ect depends on
the magnitude of the innovation variance. For high values of the innovation
variance the second e⁄ect is dominant. For values in the middle of the
variance range, the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates for low values of persistence, and
the second e⁄ect for high values.
Tables 3 and 4 show that our result is robust to any reasonable calibra-
tion of the productivity shocks. Only for relatively non-persistent idiosyn-
cratic shocks with standard deviations around ￿ve times lower than those
estimated in the literature, does the impact response of consumption come
close to that under full information.
Table 5: Impact e⁄ect of aggregate technology shock on
aggregate consumption: sensitivity to the elasticity of labour
supply,
￿ 1 20 10 5 2 1 0:5
￿0:272 ￿0:306 ￿0:341 ￿0:410 ￿0:601 ￿0:936 ￿1:55
NB: base case shown in bold
Finally we examine sensitivity of our results to the elasticity of labour
supply. The left-most column, with ￿ = 1, corresponds to the case of
31￿xed labour supply. As labour supply becomes more elastic, moving right,
consumption responds more negatively. To understand why this is so,
note that returns depend on aggregate labour supply rt = ￿3 (at + ht ￿ kt).
When labour supply becomes more elastic, the household varies it more
in response to the observed innovations to returns and the wage. Since
all households behave identically in response to an aggregate productivity
shock, this means aggregate labour increases by more (though not observably
so to any individual household), and returns increase by more on impact, so
the observed innovation to returns becomes greater. The negative response
of consumption arises from the ambiguity in the signal provided by a positive
innovation to returns, so, as labour supply responds more, consumption will
respond more negatively.
7 Conclusions
We believe that our model is only a starting-point for the analysis of the link
between heterogeneity, market incompleteness and informational problems.
We have shown a very stark contrast with the standard complete markets
model; but we do not yet know how robust this contrast will be to further
modi￿cations.
On the one hand it might easily be argued that capital is the only asset
is too drastic a deviation from the standard model, given that we do observe
at least some risk-sharing by ￿nancial markets. Introducing a limited, if still
incomplete range of tradeable ￿nancial assets could change our results.
Also, markets are not the only source of information available to house-
holds: government statistical o¢ ces provide estimates of aggregates which
must in some degree ease the informational problem. If we were to model a
statistical o¢ ce that could a) measure the true factor incomes of individual
households; b) sample a large number of household types; and c) could do
so in real time, its estimates of total output would approach the true value,
and it would be straightforward in our log-linear economy to infer the true
values of both aggregate states, allowing each household in turn to back out
values of idiosyncratic states. But no actual statistical o¢ ce would claim
to be able to resolve all practical problems associated with a) and b); and
the practical implementation of c) is essentially impossible. Furthermore
the problem of inferring states from output would be enormously harder
32in a complex, non-linear economy. Hence, while a statistical o¢ ce could
certainly mitigate the informational problem it cannot solve it.17
On the other hand, while our results show that the informational limi-
tations due to incomplete markets can have very signi￿cant e⁄ects it is very
easy to argue that we may be signi￿cantly understating the extent of the
informational problem. Our model is highly simpli￿ed, with only a sin-
gle source of idiosyncratic uncertainty and strong assumptions of symmetry
across households. A central assumption of our analysis is that agents do
at least know the structure and parameters of our model; and our applica-
tion of the Kalman Filter makes the common assumption that the ￿ltering
parameters have converged. There is a large body of research, both on
model uncertainty (for example Hansen and Sargent, 2001) and learning
(Evans and Honkapohja, 2003) that would question these assumptions. In
the context of our model, a natural question to ask is whether the joint
time series process for the observables that arises from the solution to the
￿ltering problem is learnable; and if it is, whether the underlying structural
parameters of the model are uniquely identi￿ed. Even if both these strong
conditions are met, it is easy to see that the inferences made by agents in
our model would require very large amounts of data.
Until these issues have been investigated, we would hesitate to draw
strong empirical conclusions from our analysis. Nonetheless our results do
show a very distinct contrast from the standard benchmark model in break-
ing, or at least weakening, the positive short-term correlation between con-
sumption, employment, and underlying returns on capital, implied by full
information. We suspect that the alternative dynamics implied by our
analysis may in due course generate insights into the well-known puzzles in
macroeconomics and ￿nance relating to these correlations.
17Hayek￿ s (1945) original analysis of the signalling role of prices was embedded in a
critique of the distorting role of state planning. Our analysis suggests that ,even in a
fully competitive economy there may after all be some role for the state, albeit of a limited
nature, in mitigating the informational problems caused by incomplete markets.
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